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Navigating Iran Sanctions Risk Across the Gulf

One Threat, Six National Responses

📅 November 16, 2026

This article was co-authored by Danny McGlynn, President at the Institute for Financial Integrity, and John Kidd, Co-Managing Partner at Kompass Limited.

Since February, Iran and its proxies have attacked the Gulf Cooperation Council’s member states. In a joint statement on July 23, all six members and Jordan condemned “the treacherous aggression launched by Iran and its proxies” and affirmed their right to self-defense. On the threat itself, the six have spoken with one voice. On the financial front, the subject of this article, they have not: each government has decided for itself how far to cut Iran off from its banks, traders, and ports.

The UAE has gone furthest. On August 19 it halted all trade and financial dealings with Iran, and in September it barred Bank Melli’s UAE branches from transacting with Iran. Elsewhere the emphasis is different. Saudi Arabia, under renewed Houthi fire, co-chairs the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center with the United States, which has made joint Hizballah designations with other Gulf states. Kuwait, which Iran has also struck, is focused on leaving the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. Bahrain has taken the issue to the UN Security Council. Qatar is mediating between Washington and Tehran. Oman, whose role in dialogue the GCC praised, has been warned by Washington about Iranian sanctions evasion.

That divergence matters for banks. A bank that operates in more than one Gulf state, or clears for them, cannot assume one regulator’s expectations carry over to the next. This article looks at how Iran-related sanctions risk is playing out across the region, why national responses differ and why geopolitical insight now belongs alongside technical compliance. It closes with a UAE case study showing what the pressure looks like inside one supervisory system.

In brief

  • Sanctions are now a national security issue in the Gulf, and the risk is regional while the responses are national.
  • Six states, six postures: from the UAE’s trade halt to Qatar’s mediation and Oman’s balancing.
  • Understanding why each government acts as it does helps banks anticipate where scrutiny may increase.
  • Expect the pressure to last. Multi-state banks need one method with local overlays.

Sanctions have become a national security issue

For years, Iran-related sanctions reached Gulf banks mainly as an external compliance burden. This year’s war changed that. Iran has struck Gulf territory directly, and the effects reached the financial sector. In the war’s first days, Kuwait’s exchange stayed shut and the Dubai and Abu Dhabi exchanges closed for two days. On March 11, the Iranian military’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters declared “economic centres and banks” belonging to the United States and Israel in the region to be targets and told residents to stay a kilometer away from banks. In April, drone strikes led National Bank of Kuwait to close its headquarters for two days.

Washington has fused that security threat with economic pressure. Operation Economic Outcast, launched on August 24, aims to cut Iran off from the global financial system, and it depends on other governments acting. The U.S. Treasury Secretary said teams from the Treasury, State, and War departments have engaged counterparts around the world, that every country has been given a defined timeline to shut down the Iran-related activity the U.S. has identified, and that if they fail to act, Treasury will. Secretary Bessent added that the President is making phone calls to world leaders with specific requests to cease their interactions with the regime. The U.S. Treasury has held discussions with more than 50 countries, according to press reports, and Treasury’s FinCEN has convened global financial institutions to share insights into the key nodes, facilitators, and networks that provide Iran and its proxies with access to the financial system.

  • On August 18 UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed received a phone call from President Trump during which they discussed the latest developments in the Middle East and ongoing efforts to address them, and UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed spoke to Secretary of State Marco Rubio about continued UAE-U.S. coordination to hold Iran and its proxies accountable for ongoing attacks.
  • U.S. Secretary Bessent has publicly thanked the UAE, Oman, and Türkiye for help with isolating Iran, citing the cessation of flights of all Iranian airlines by the UAE and of Mahan Air by Oman and Türkiye, and claiming that top commercial banks in the UAE and Türkiye have stopped transacting with Iran.

The risk is regional, but the responses are national. Each Gulf government is balancing the same four things: its security, its economic ties with Iran, its diplomatic role, and its standing with Washington and the FATF. The next sections show how those balances have come out.

One threat, six responses

The table below summarizes how each Gulf state has been exposed to Iranian and proxy attacks and how its government and financial sector have responded. It’s a snapshot rather than a ranking, and positions are changing quickly. Entries draw on official statements where available and on press reporting otherwise.

State Exposure Response and posture Financial sector context
UAE Struck repeatedly since February. Iran’s trade with the UAE was about $21 billion in the 10 months before the war, according to official Iranian figures. Halted all trade and financial transactions with Iran on Aug 19. Suspended all flights by Iranian airlines. Withdrew its remaining forces from Yemen in December 2025 after a Saudi-led strike on a UAE-linked shipment. CBUAE barred Bank Melli’s UAE branches from Iran transactions on Sept 23 and ordered financial institutions to conduct a Banque Misr UAE lookback in late August.
Saudi Arabia Iranian drones and missiles hit its eastern regions and Riyadh until an April truce. Houthi strikes resumed on July 13 and continued on Oct 27, when the coalition reported intercepting missiles and drones. On Oct 10, a Houthi missile struck Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, killing 13. A Sept 29 U.S. designation of a Saudi-based entity involved in Iranian military procurement was taken in coordination with the Saudi government. Saudi/U.S.-led TFTC designated Hizballah financial entities in June and September. No Iran-specific central bank measure found. Co-chairs the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) with the US.
Kuwait Iranian drones hit its airport and fuel tanks on April 1, and National Bank of Kuwait closed its headquarters. Part of the GCC’s unified condemnation of the attacks. On the FATF grey list since February and remained on after the October plenary. Decision 25 of 2026 penalizes DNFBPs, including gold dealers, KD 4,000 and a six-month suspension for not checking sanctions lists.
Bahrain Iranian drone attacks on June 27 and again in July. Home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Submitted UN Security Council Resolution 2817 for the GCC states and Jordan. Treasury designated Bahrain-based Bank Melli-controlled Future Bank in 2008, citing cooperation from Bahraini authorities. The EU and UK also relisted Future Bank after the snapback of UN sanctions in 2025.
Qatar Reportedly holds about $6 billion in Iranian funds moved from South Korea in 2023. Iran’s central bank governor visited Doha on May 25 for talks on the funds. Mediates with Pakistan and Oman. Iran passed its latest proposal to Washington through Qatari mediators. Calls U.S. sanctions unilateral and says it backs no party against another, while rejecting Iran’s closure of Hormuz. Prime Minister visited Tehran on Aug 27 to mediate.
Oman The GCC praised its role in dialogue. It is negotiating a Hormuz shipping framework with Iran. It never joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen Treasury Secretary Bessent warned it on May 28 over any Hormuz toll scheme and threatened sanctions. It halted Mahan Air flights in September. Bank Melli and Bank Saderat remain licensed in Oman, according to the Central Bank of Oman register.

Why the responses differ

One pressure is the same in every capital: Treasury controls access to the U.S. dollar system, and Secretary Bessent has said any entity facilitating Iranian money laundering would be removed from it. In our assessment, five factors explain why governments respond to it differently.

  1. Who is under fire. The UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain have been hit directly, so they have the strongest security case for cutting Iran’s financial access. The UAE’s August halt on all trade and financial dealings followed an Iranian missile strike on its waters.
  2. How entangled the economy is. Before the war, the UAE supplied more than 30% of Iran’s imports, about $21 billion a year, and took nearly 13% of its exports, about $7 billion. Cutting those ties costs Dubai most, which is why the UAE’s move stands out.
  3. Diplomatic role. Qatar and Oman are mediators. Qatar holds Iranian funds and says it backs no party against another, and Oman negotiates Hormuz arrangements with Tehran. Visible financial moves against Iran are harder for them.
  4. Security ties with Washington. The U.S. has forces in five of the six states, from the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to Al Udeid in Qatar, and Oman gives it naval access. Those ties give Washington leverage and give hosts a guarantee, but they also make hosts targets: Iran has struck near U.S. facilities in Bahrain and Qatar.
  5. FATF standing. Kuwait is on the grey list, the UAE left it in 2024 and faces a new evaluation, and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain may face visits in November (see table below). Showing assessors that sanctions controls work gives each government a reason to act on Iran-related exposure that does not depend on Washington.

Each factor pulls differently in each capital. That’s why a single regional template will not work.

FATF standing at a glance

State FATF status and last evaluation Next evaluation (possible) Sanctions-related findings
UAE Off the grey list since Feb 2024, last evaluated Apr 2020 On-site Jun 2026, plenary Feb 2027 Understanding of proliferation financing risk “still emerging”
Saudi Arabia Not listed, last evaluated Sep 2018 On-site Nov 2026, plenary Jun 2027 Low effectiveness on proliferation financing sanctions
Kuwait On the grey list since Feb 2026, last evaluated Oct 2024 On-site Nov 2030, plenary Jun 2031. Grey list progress is reviewed at plenaries Action plan requires accurate beneficial ownership data and penalties for false filings
Bahrain Not listed, last evaluated Sep 2018 On-site Nov 2026, plenary Jun 2027 Moderate effectiveness on proliferation financing sanctions
Qatar Not listed, last evaluated May 2023 On-site Jun 2029, plenary Feb 2030 Proliferation financing sanctions rated “moderate”
Oman Not listed, last evaluated Dec 2024, in enhanced follow-up On-site Jun 2030, plenary Feb 2031 Proliferation financing sanctions rated “substantial”

Note: Evaluation dates are the possible months listed in FATF’s assessment schedule and may change.

Geopolitical insight belongs beside compliance

Technical compliance tells a bank whether a transaction is permitted. Geopolitical insight tells it something different: how its regulator is likely to behave, and how soon. Three episodes this autumn show the gap.

  • Attacks precede supervision. Iran’s missile strike on UAE waters on August 18 was followed by the trade halt the next day, a Banque Misr examination within two weeks, and a Bank Melli bar five weeks later. The sequence shows why banks should review their exposure early when tensions rise.
  • Diplomacy often precedes designations.S. pressure often arrives through leader-level calls, envoys, timelines, and warning letters before public designations. The UAE announced its halt hours after calls with Washington at presidential and cabinet level. In April, Treasury warned the UAE of potential secondary sanctions, and China, Hong Kong and Oman received similar letters. The US also warned Oman in public over any Hormuz toll scheme.
  • Neutrality does not protect. Qatar and Oman may move more slowly than the UAE, but OFAC has warned that foreign banks that keep transacting with sanctioned Iranian banks “could be targeted at any time without advance notification.” Banks in countries that mediate can still face U.S. secondary sanctions, depending on their dealings and the applicable rules. On October 21, after designating a Dubai-based shipping company, Secretary Bessent warned that “Iran’s facilitators must make a choice: Either you are with us or against us.”

Banks can watch for six signals:

  1. Attacks on national territory or shipping.
  2. Leader-level calls, U.S. envoy visits, deadlines, and warning letters to local institutions.
  3. Designations of local entities, especially those taken “in coordination” with the host government.
  4. FATF plenary dates, on-site visits, and evaluation milestones.
  5. Mediation milestones, which can raise or lower the cost of visible action.
  6. Regulators using new enforcement powers, such as the CBUAE’s use of its 2025 Central Bank law. The CBUAE’s Oct 30 fine on a foreign bank branch is a recent example.

None of this replaces technical controls. It tells a bank where to point them first and how much time it has.

Challenges for banks operating across the Gulf

Banks with a footprint in several Gulf states, and banks that clear for them, face three practical problems.

  • Different regulators, different timing. The UAE’s examinations and information requests have no public equivalent elsewhere in the Gulf, although regulators may be acting without announcing it.
  • U.S. exposure across the Gulf. A bank’s exposure to U.S. primary sanctions, secondary sanctions, or special measures depends on what it does and which rules apply.
  • Group consistency. A control gap found in one jurisdiction raises questions in the others and with the home regulator.

Proxy Finance: where the Gulf acts together, and where it splits

Tehran’s financing of proxy groups often moves through ordinary looking channels such as exchange houses, trading companies, and oil sales, so banks can be exposed without any direct link to Iran. It’s also where Gulf interests both overlap and diverge.

  • The Houthis. Hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have resumed and are intensifying. The Houthis fired missiles at Saudi Arabia on July 13, the first claimed strikes since the informal truce of March 2022. On October 10, a Houthi strike on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed 13 people. By late October the coalition was reporting interceptions of Houthi missiles and drones.
  • The coalition is not a Gulf bloc. When it launched in 2015, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar joined Saudi Arabia, but Oman did not. In December 2025, after a Saudi-led strike on a UAE-linked weapons shipment at Mukalla, the UAE announced the withdrawal of its remaining forces from Yemen, and Riyadh accused Abu Dhabi of backing southern separatists. Saudi Arabia and the UAE therefore approach the Houthi front from different positions.
  • For banks, the point is where Houthi money moves. A January 16 Treasury action targeted front companies and facilitators in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE. It said Iran sells and ships oil to the Houthis through Iranian-owned or affiliated companies based in Dubai. One designated Dubai trading company, Janat Al Anhar General Trading LLC, linked Sanaa traders to UAE financial channels and was the new name of a firm designated in 2024. Yemeni banks are in the frame too: the U.S. designated International Bank of Yemen in April 2025 after the terrorist listing of the Houthis prompted eight Sanaa banks to relocate to Aden.
  • Hezbollah and the TFTC. On June 30, all six GCC states and the U.S. jointly designated five entities and 16 individuals in Hezbollah’s financial network, the ninth Terrorist Financing Targeting Center action since the center was created in 2017. On September 10 the center followed up, again acting jointly, with designations of a Hezbollah-linked gold exchange company and a senior Al-Qard Al-Hassan official. Saudi Arabia co-chairs the center with the U.S. Gulf states can act together on proxy finance even where they differ on Iran itself.

Banks should therefore build proxy typologies into their Iran methodology: exchange houses, trading companies, and fuel or shipping firms serving Sanaa or Beirut. They should also treat TFTC actions as a signal of coordinated national designations.

A workable response has six parts.

  1. Map each jurisdiction’s posture and the signals above, and refresh the map monthly.
  2. Run one group method for Iran exposure: common definitions, data standards, and network analysis, with local overlays for each regulator’s requests.
  3. Tie escalation triggers to signals. An attack on national territory or a U.S. letter to local institutions should trigger a targeted review in that jurisdiction.
  4. Brief the board on the political read as well as control status.
  5. Prepare for information requests everywhere, not only the UAE: retrievable data, written definitions, and named sign-off.
  6. Check cross-border limits early. Data sharing and tipping-off rules differ by country, so involve legal advisers before a group review starts.

Throughout, avoid blanket exits. They are easy to defend internally, but they can push activity into weaker channels and miss the real networks.

Outlook: the pressure will last

We expect the pressure to continue, and the evidence is strong. Treasury describes Operation Economic Outcast as “a sustained and systematic campaign.” Secretary Bessent called it “a sustained campaign to collapse every last option for Iran” and said it would gather force every day.

Timing points the same way. Axios reported that officials expect secondary sanctions to remain the main tool until at least after the U.S. midterm elections. In late September, Secretary Bessent said the campaign also aims to make sure Iran sticks to any future deal. And although President Trump has said the war will end “very soon,” either through renewed fighting or through Iran accepting U.S. terms, neither outcome in itself ends the financial campaign.

The security picture offers no early relief. The June 17 interim accord expired in August amid renewed fighting. The Houthi front has reignited too: Saudi Arabia is now under missile and drone fire again. Mediation by Qatar and Pakistan continues, but Tehran says it will not fully reopen Hormuz unless Washington lifts its blockade, unfreezes assets, and removes oil sanctions. Iran says it could reopen Hormuz within two days if Washington accepts its demands.

Pressure from outside Washington also persists. FATF’s call for countermeasures against Iran, reiterated on October 30, stays until Iran completes its action plan. UN sanctions are back in force. And other jurisdictions have tightened their own rules, as the UK did this year. Banks with UK links must meet those requirements whatever happens in Washington.

The main variable is a U.S.-Iran deal. Even then, we would expect FATF, UN, UK, and supervisory expectations to ease more slowly than U.S. pressure, if at all. And because Gulf governments act for their own reasons, a deal in Washington would not simply reverse the responses described here.

Case study: the UAE

The UAE shows what these pressures look like inside one supervisory system.

In November 2018, the governor of the UAE’s central bank said that Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, two Iranian banks that largely serve Iranians, would keep operating in the country. On September 23, 2026, the CBUAE reversed course for Bank Melli. It barred every UAE branch from any transaction to or from Iran, citing breaches of anti-money laundering and countering terrorist and proliferation financing rules. The bank had operated in the UAE since 1969.

Weeks earlier, a second case had set the tone. On August 28, FinCEN proposed a Section 311 restriction on U.S. correspondent banking for the five UAE branches of Banque Misr. FinCEN identified about $1.8 billion in transactions through accounts linked to 103 potential front companies. The next day the CBUAE ordered an urgent examination with a forensic lookback.

What supervision looks like

  • Examination-led enforcement. The Bank Melli measure rests on examination results and a power under Article 168(1)(c) of the 2025 Central Bank law. It names no specific control gap.
  • Fines reach individuals. On October 30, the CBUAE fined an unnamed foreign bank branch AED200 million for “significant,” repeated failures” in AML/CFT, governance and its sanctions framework. It also fined the CEO and the head of compliance personally and ordered an independently validated remediation program. The release does not mention Iran.
  • Routine effectiveness testing. The CBUAE says its reviews test sanctions screening effectiveness.
  • Information requests. According to multiple industry sources, banks have received CBUAE requests for Iran-related information reaching back several years. Scope varies and none is public, so banks should confirm the period, definition, and deadline rather than assume a fixed lookback is mandatory.
  • U.S. signals. OFAC now warns that foreign banks could be targeted “at any time without advance notification” and amended its FAQ 156 on October 5 to refer to that alert. The U.S. enforcement period for violations under IEEPA and TWEA is now 10 years, and OFAC separately extended its recordkeeping requirement to 10 years.

What U.S. guidance says to look for

The CBUAE rulebook includes UAE red flags for proliferation financing and sanctions evasion. U.S. guidance sets out further patterns specific to Iran.

  • General trading and front companies: General trading companies with opaque ownership in UAE free trade zones are a high-risk company type (FinCEN alert, May 11, 2026)
  • Shared addresses and thin profiles: Likely shell companies are recently incorporated, lack a web presence and share addresses or counterparties with designated Iranian companies (same alert)
  • Exchange houses and trading networks: Networks of exchange houses, trading companies and front companies sell oil and launder proceeds (FinCEN advisory, June 6, 2025). A Treasury action on Oct 15 targeted four exchange houses and a Dubai-based oil trustee (Treasury).
  • Oil supply chain intermediaries: Apply enhanced due diligence to Asia- and Middle East-based entities in the oil chain to China (OFAC alert, Apr 28, 2026)

A Dubai precedent

In 2019, OFAC settled with a London-headquartered bank for $639 million over Iran-related conduct, mostly through its Dubai branches. Among the findings: a free zone company owned by an Iranian national kept processing dollar payments while the bank never linked it to the owner’s personal account, and two general trading companies sent payment instructions by fax from Iran. The bank had an Iran tagging process. What failed was linking the data, testing controls, and acting on warnings, which is what a lookback now tests.

What good looks like

  • Treat Iran as a strategic risk, owned by senior management, not only a screening task.
  • Run an evidence-led review of direct and indirect links, using network analysis rather than list matches alone.
  • Define scope in writing: what counts as Iran-related, which periods, which systems.
  • Separate legal prohibition from exposure. Record which controls meet a binding duty and which manage U.S., EU, UK, or reputational risk.
  • Engage the regulator early, and resource the effort for the long haul.

Annex: Self-Assessment Checklist for Gulf Banks

Area Questions to ask Evidence a supervisor will want
Posture mapping Do we track each Gulf jurisdiction’s stance and signals? Monthly posture map, named owner, escalation log
Group governance Who owns Iran risk across the group, and does the board see it? Named senior owner, board minutes, documented risk appetite
Definitions and data Is “Iran-related” defined once, and can we retrieve years of data in every jurisdiction? Written definition, data map, tested extracts, known gaps
Indirect activity Do rules catch front companies, general trading companies, exchange houses, and third-country payments? Scenario inventory, tuning records, network analysis outputs
Cross-border consistency Do local overlays sit on one group method, and are cross-border limits understood? Method document, legal advice on data sharing
Regulator engagement Have we told each supervisor what we found and how we are fixing it? Meeting notes, dated remediation plan

Turn regional insight into controls your team can defend

At the Institute for Financial Integrity, we work with financial institutions to assess where staff knowledge and skills fall short of their risk profile, then build customized training that closes those gaps, from Iran-related sanctions exposure and proxy finance typologies to beneficial ownership and the convergence of AML and sanctions obligations. Our DOLFIN® platform extends that work with on-demand learning for compliance teams at every level.

Talk to IFI about a training needs assessment for your organization.

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Because these cookies are strictly necessary to deliver the website, refusing them will have impact how our site functions. You always can block or delete cookies by changing your browser settings and force blocking all cookies on this website. But this will always prompt you to accept/refuse cookies when revisiting our site.

We fully respect if you want to refuse cookies but to avoid asking you again and again kindly allow us to store a cookie for that. You are free to opt out any time or opt in for other cookies to get a better experience. If you refuse cookies we will remove all set cookies in our domain.

We provide you with a list of stored cookies on your computer in our domain so you can check what we stored. Due to security reasons we are not able to show or modify cookies from other domains. You can check these in your browser security settings.

Google Analytics Cookies

These cookies collect information that is used either in aggregate form to help us understand how our website is being used or how effective our marketing campaigns are, or to help us customize our website and application for you in order to enhance your experience.

If you do not want that we track your visit to our site you can disable tracking in your browser here:

Other external services

We also use different external services like Google Webfonts, Google Maps, and external Video providers. Since these providers may collect personal data like your IP address we allow you to block them here. Please be aware that this might heavily reduce the functionality and appearance of our site. Changes will take effect once you reload the page.

Google Webfont Settings:

Google Map Settings:

Google reCaptcha Settings:

Vimeo and Youtube video embeds:

Privacy Policy

You can read about our cookies and privacy settings in detail on our Privacy Policy Page.

Privacy Policy
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